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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Emcr OF PRESUMTTION OF DEATH AFTER UNFrxPLnum ABSENCE
UPON LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
Much has been written concerning the presumption of death
after a period of unexplained absence as an evidentiary rule.' Gen-
erally, most of the published material concerns use of this pre-
sumption and other evidence in establishing the fact and time of
death. It is the purpose here, however, to consider only its effect
upon life insurance when the insured disappears.
The West Virginia statute,2 similar to those of other jurisdic-
tions,3 provides in part that when a person has been absent from
the state for seven or more years without being heard from by those
persons who naturally would have heard, he shall be presumed
dead, absent any proof to the contrary. Our highest court has
recently held that the presumption will not be given effect unless all
its elements are strictly complied with.4
What effect then, does such a presumption have upon a life
insurance policy? Suppose A takes out insurance upon his own life,
naming B as beneficiary. After A has paid premiums for a number
of years, he disappears and is never heard from again. Several
obvious questions immediately arise upon such a state of facts, and
they in turn raise subordinate questions. First, is A dead? If he
is dead, when did he die? When is B entitled to collect the proceeds
of the policy? What must B do, if anything, to retain the right to
the insurance proceeds? These are only a few of the questions
which must be considered.
1. W=m DID Tm INsurm DIE?
The function of the statutory presumption of death after seven
years unexplained absence is not to determine the time of the
absentee's death, but only the fact of it. To establish the time of
his death-which is of extreme importance in insurance litigation-
there must be some evidence tending to show when it occurred, or
else it will be presumed to have occurred at the end of the seven
1 See, e.g., Roca, When Did Ulysses Die?, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 172(1954).
2 W. VA. CODE ch. 44, art 9, § 1 (Michie 1955).
3 E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 6984 (1949) (7 years); Ai.AsK, COMp. LAws
tit 62, ch. 1, § 15 (1949) (6 years); Aim. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1601 (1947)
(5 years). For a complete ling of such statutes, see Roca, supra note 1, at
183, n.16.
4 Fesher v. Board of Review, 138 W. Va. 765, 77 S.E.2d 890 (1958).
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year period.5 There is authority that the fact and time of death
may be established before the expiration of the statutory period
upon consideration of the character and habits of the missing per-
son,6 or upon proof of his exposure to some specific peril,7 in either
of which case, the presumption is of little value.
Considering again the hypothetical case of A, where there are
no facts from which a time of death could be fixed, it can be seen
that the fact of his death is not established until at least seven
years (or other statutory period) from the date of his disappearance.
In view of the presumption of continuance of life,8 it will probably
be determined that A's death occurred at the end of the seven
year period. This may mean that the policy will have lapsed before
the date fixed for A's death; on the other hand, if after the end of
the seven years period, the time of his death be established as some
earlier date-such as the date of disappearance, or some intermediate
date-the beneficiary, B, might conceivably be barred from col-
lecting the proceeds by the running of the statute of limitations.9
2. WHEN Is THE BENEFICIXRY ENTTrrLE TO TH P OCEoc s?
Of course, the beneficiary will not receive any of the proceeds
if the policy has lapsed before the time of the insured's death.10 If
the beneficiary continues to pay the premiums on the policy through-
out the period of absence, there will be no question of lapse. Ap-
parently there is no legal reason why this cannot be done, at least
in the absence of fraud or some contract provision to the contrary.1 1
On the other hand, if the beneficiary can not or does not, for some
reason or another, continue to pay the premiums for at least a por-
tion of the period of absence, the chances are that the policy will
lapse before the end of the statutory period, depending upon a
5 United States v. O'Brien, 51 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1931).6 Security Bank v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 112 Va. 462, 71 S.E. 647
(1911); Tisdale v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 170 (1868).
7 See Roca, supra note 1, at 189 and n.25.
s Simpson v. Simpson, 162 Va. 621, 175 S.E. 320 (1934).
9 Usually the beneficiary is protected in such a case by holding that his
cause of action does not accrue until the fact of death is established, or by
some other means. Frechette v. Travelers Ins. Co., 70 R.I. 347, 38 A.2d 645
(1944); see Roca, supra note 1, at 190.
10 National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ruffin, 237 Ala. 401, 187 So. 488
(1939); Security Bank v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 112 Va. 462, 71 S.E.
647 (1911).11 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 92 F.2d 274 (4th Cir.
1937); Behlmer v. Grand Lodge, 109 Minn. 305, 123 N.W. 1071 (1909).
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number of factors. An interesting question is presented in case the
beneficiary does continue to pay premiums throughout all or part
of the period of disappearance. Will he be entitled to their return
with interest in case death is established at some earlier time?
Apparently this question has not been decided.
In West Virginia, and probably all the other states, all life
insurance policies are required by statute to have nonforfeiture
provisions.12 The effect of such provisions is to extend the life of
the policy, depending upon a number of factors, either for a period
of time at: the face amount (extended term insurance) or indefinitely
at some reduced amount (paid-up insurance). A sampling of
four policies shows that three of them provide for automatic ex-
tended term insurance upon failure to pay premiums,' 3 while the
fourth provides for paid-up insurance in a reduced amount.14 The
provisions of the policies indicate that only the insured, on his own
application, has the power to change from extended term to paid-up
insurance, so in the case of a disappearance, apparently the bene-
ficiary would be bound by the policy provision.
Where the policy provides for automatic paid-up insurance, the
time of death established by presumption will not be critical, since
there is no danger of lapse within the seven year period. The
amount of the benefit would, however, be sharply reduced 15 from
the face amount, depending, among other things, upon the type of
policy, the period it had been in force, and the age of the insured.
It would appear that the beneficiary could collect the value of paid-
up insurance immediately at the end of the statutory absence period,
or if he had continued to pay premiums, he could then collect the
face amount.
Where the insurance contract provides for automatic extended
term coverage upon failure to pay premiums, the time of death
of the insured becomes extremely important. At the end of the
extended term, the policy lapses, and if the death of the insured
is established after lapse, there can be no recovery. Since the
length of the extended term depends upon the same factors as does
12 W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 13, § § 9, 30 (Michie Supp. 1958).
13 Franldin Lift Ins. Co., participating 20 payment life; Fidelity Mut. Life
Ins. Co., participating 30 payment life; National Serv. Life Ins., ordinary life.
14 Equitable Life Ins. Co., juvenile 20 payment, 75 year endowment.
15 At the end of the fourth policy year, paid-up insurance value is $122;
sixth year, $187; eighth year, $287; twelfth year, $494 (per $1000).
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the amount of paid-up insurance, it is quite possible that the term
will not be sufficiently long to cover the entire statutory period. 16
Policy Year Extended Term (At Face Amount)
Completed Franklin Fidelity Nat'l Ser.
2 4 yrs. 227 days 8 yrs. 76 days 2 yrs. 11 days
4 16 281 18 806 4 96
6 20 807 20 203 6 251
7 7 851
In such a case, the beneficiary would do well to read the nonfor-
feiture provisions and tables of the policy, and if possible pay the
premiums for a sufficient time to extend coverage over the entire
statutory period.
Once again considering the case of A, we find that B must wait
until the end of seven years from the time of A's disappearance
before suing his insurer for the insurance benefit If A's contract
provided for automatic paid-up insurance, B would then be entitled
to recover this reduced amount regardless of the time of A's death.
But if the contract provided for automatic extended term coverage,
B must either establish the time of A's death within that term, or
else continue to pay premiums until the term is sufficient to cover
the remainder of the statutory period.
Although the presumption of death after unexplained absence
has been severely criticised, it would seem to serve a useful purpose
when there is no evidence upon which the fact or time of death
can be established. While obviously the presumption may serve
to deprive a beneficiary of life insurance proceeds at the time when
they are needed most, yet the deprivation will not be permanent,
provided only that the beneficiary acts when necessary to protect
his interest.
R. G. D.
16 Note the variation in length of extended term under policies listed in
note 18, supra.
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